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Catching Up in Broadband Regressions: 
Does Local Loop Unbundling Really Lead to Material 
Increases in OECD Broadband Uptake? 
 
Abstract 
Local loop unbundling has been widely promulgated by policy-makers as a significant 
factor stimulating broadband uptake and therefore an essential component of a 
developing ‘information economy’.   Whilst empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, 
one recent study commissioned and published by the OECD (OECD, 2007) does find 
a statistically significant effect of unbundling on broadband uptake.  On closer 
examination however, the economic magnitude of this effect is trivial.  Moreover, 
once the error structure of the data is properly accounted for, the statistical 
significance disappears.  As a result, the OECD report cannot be used to justify the 
view that local loop unbundling leads to greater broadband uptake.   
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Increases in OECD Broadband Uptake? 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Broadband internet access, as the frontier technology via which individuals can access 
the internet, is widely perceived as a vital factor driving a country’s economic growth 
potential (e.g., Crandall, Hahn & Tardiff, 2002).  Broadband penetration, typically 
measured as the number of connections per capita, and as reported regularly by policy 
institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the International Telecommunication Union, is widely used by policy-
makers to benchmark the relative potential of different countries to garner the 
economic benefits of internet connectivity.  Rightly or wrongly, higher national levels 
of broadband penetration per capita have come to be equated with, if not superior 
performance in the emerging ‘internet economy’, then at least a greater potential to 
benefit from the economic gains that are perceived to be available.  The pursuit of 
higher penetration levels, especially amongst the OECD countries, has become a form 
of international ‘competition’, with the policy environments of the successive 
‘winners’ being scoured for evidence of those factors deemed to be instrumental in 
creating that country’s ‘success’ (Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak, 2007). 
Policy-makers, anxious to isolate a simple policy lever that can be pulled to 
accelerate broadband uptake, have encouraged the creation of a substantial body of 
research endeavouring to identify the factors which are instrumental in determining 
levels of broadband uptake, and explain observed cross-country differences in 
broadband penetration (OECD, 2000; 2001; 2003; 2005; 2007a).   A primary area of 
interest is whether open access policies such as local loop unbundling have a material 
effect upon the level of broadband uptake in a given country.   
Under unbundling arrangements, competitors to an incumbent 
telecommunications provider can install their own equipment in incumbents’ 
exchange facilities and lease access to ‘last mile’ copper connections to end-
consumers.  Entrants can then compete with the incumbent by providing differentiated 
services whilst simultaneously utilising the incumbent’s investment in ‘bottleneck 
assets’.  Theoretically, unbundling of the local loop should stimulate increased 
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broadband uptake by increasing product variety and putting price pressure on the 
incumbent (Cave, 2006).  For this reason, along with its ability to induce competition 
where otherwise it might not have existed for increasingly privatized incumbent 
telecommunications firms, unbundling has been ardently advocated by policy bodies 
such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
the European Regulators Group of the European Union. However, unbundling has 
also been associated with some less attractive features: reducing the incentives for 
incumbent providers to invest in existing and new networks, and delaying the point at 
which entrants will invest in full stand-alone competing infrastructure, especially if 
the regulated access prices do not adequately compensate the incumbent for the risks 
associated with new technologies for which consumer demand is uncertain (Hausman 
& Sidak, 2005).    
Given this ambiguity, it is natural to ask whether widespread local loop 
unbundling has had the desired effect of materially increasing national broadband 
uptake levels.  Such a question is not just of academic interest.  Although redundant 
as a policy issue in the 28 OECD countries where it has been adopted, the answer can 
still help inform the debate and policy formulation in other countries where 
unbundling has not yet been implemented. It might also usefully inform the debate 
about whether other telecommunications networks, such as fibre-to-the-home, should 
also be subject to access regulation in order to further increase uptake of broadband 
connectivity,   
Empirical evidence on this issue is limited, and yields varying conclusions.  
For example, some studies find that unbundling has a positive, but very small and 
statistically insignificant, effect on broadband uptake (e.g. Distaso, Lupi & Manenti, 
2006; Kim, Bauer & Wildman, 2003; Cava-Ferrruela & Alabau-Munoz, 2006); others 
that the effect is neither consistently positive nor statistically significant (Wallsten, 
2006); and still others that it is small and transient (Denni & Gruber, 2005).  As a 
result of this ambiguity, the sole empirical study commissioned and published by the 
OECD takes on considerable importance. Using individual country data from both 
2002 and 2005, OECD (2007) concludes that “unbundling….is currently more 
significant than platform competition in explaining broadband penetration” and 
recommends that “(t)his fact suggests that if platform competition does not 
materialise, government or regulatory policy aimed at increasing broadband 
penetration rates should focus on determining the appropriate pricing structure for the 
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unbundled local loop or consider the use of subsidies to increase broadband 
infrastructure or penetration rates” (p20).  Whilst the paper notes that the opinions 
expressed are those of its author (John de Ridder) and thus do not necessarily reflect 
the official views of the OECD itself or of the governments of its member countries, 
the conclusions supporting local loop unbundling are consistent with previous OECD 
advocacy for the policy (OECD, 2003; OECD, 2005; OECD, 2007a).   
This paper subjects the OECD (2007) results to closer examination, a process 
that yields two principal conclusions.  First, the statistically significant relationship 
between local loop unbundling and broadband uptake disappears once the estimation 
procedure is corrected to allow for standard errors that take account of clustering in 
the data (section 2).  Second, even if such statistical issues are ignored, the estimated 
economic impact of unbundling on broadband uptake is essentially trivial, particularly 
in comparison to other factors (section 3).  As a result, we conclude that the OECD 
(2007) analysis does not provide a robust basis for claims that local loop unbundling 
can be a principal means of increasing broadband penetration rates.   
 
2. Local loop unbundling and broadband uptake: statistical issues 
Using 2002 and 2005 data from up to 30 OECD countries, OECD (2007) estimates 
regression equations of the general form:1 
 
QTOT = α + βGUYRS + γX + ε     (1) 
 
where:  2 
QTOT = broadband connections per 100 population (measure of broadband 
penetration) 
GUYRS = number of years since the implementation of local loop unbundling 
(measure of unbundling presence)3  
and X is a vector of control variables that potentially affect broadband uptake.  
Among the variables included in X are:4 
                                                       
1   2002 data appear in the appendix; 2005 data are in OECD (2007).  
2   To facilitate comparison, we use the same variable notation as OECD (2007).  
3   One slightly arbitrary feature of the OECD (2007) use of this variable is that, for countries that had not adopted 
local loop unbundling by 2005, the 2005 value of GUYRS was set equal to zero and the 2002 value equal to -3. In 
any event, truncating 2002 values of GUYRS at zero leaves all the results of this paper essentially unchanged. 
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LNPDSL = natural log of monthly price per megabit-second of DSL (in $US PPP) 
AGE = share of the population aged between 35 and 44 years 
UURB = percentage of the the population defined as urbanised 
CFAC = non-DSL connections as a percentage of total broadband connections 
(measure of broadband competition) 
DUMMY = 1 if observation is for 2005, 0 otherwise. 
 
OECD (2007) employs OLS estimation of equation (1) in a variety of 
specifications, using both single-year (2005) and panel data.  When only 2005 data 
are used, statistically significant estimates of β are found only in models that exclude 
price (LNPDSL), suggesting that the unbundling proxy (GUYRS) is simply capturing 
more fundamental price effects.  However, when the 2002 and 2005 data are 
combined in a panel, two regressions report estimates of β that are significantly 
positive at the 1% level.  These models appear in columns (A) and (B) of Table 1, 
where the terms in parentheses contain t-statistics based on OLS standard errors.5  As 
can be seen, the estimated GUYRS coefficients in these models range between 0.59 
and 0.65 and have high t-statistics. These findings are the basis of OECD’s (2007, 
p17) contention that unbundling is “a key explanatory variable” for broadband 
penetration.6  
Although these results suggest that local loop unbundling is an important stimulant of 
broadband uptake, the use of panel data necessitates some caution.  As Petersen 
(2007) points out, residual clustering in panels can result in OLS standard errors 
containing significant bias, and hence in t-statistics that are considerably overstated.  
In the OECD (2007) data, the potential for time series clustering of residuals by 
country is high, given that 2005 broadband observations for each country are likely to 
                                                                                                                                                            
4  The economic intuition underlying these variables is discussed in OECD (2007). 
5  Although we are not able to replicate the OECD (2007, Table 6) results exactly (presumably due to data 
revisions), we are able to get very close.  Moreover, the size and statistical significance of the GUYRS coefficient 
estimates are generally greater than those reported in the OECD paper. 
6 On the other hand, the estimated CFAC coefficient in column (B) suggests that the degree of platform 
competition has little impact on broadband penetration.  Together, these results form the basis for the OECD 
(2007, p20) claim that “unbundling….is currently more significant than platform competition in explaining 
broadband penetration.” 
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be related to their 2002 counterparts.7  Consequently, the results in Table 1 may give a 
misleading impression of the importance of local loop unbundling in determining the 
extent of broadband penetration. 
  
 
Table 1: OECD (2007) Regression Analysis with Robust Standard Errors 
Data are drawn from 2002 (24 countries) and 2005 (30 countries). The 
dependent variable is broadband connections per 100 population (QTOT). t-
statistics based on OLS standard errors are in parentheses; terms in square 
brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors that are robust to time series 
clustering. ** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
 Variable (A) (B) 
 GUYRS 0.587 0.652 
      (2.69)** 
[1.75] 
    (2.96)** 
[1.86] 
 
  
LNPDSL 
 
-2.014 
 
-1.979 
      (4.05)** 
    [4.25]** 
     (3.90)** 
     [3.43]** 
 
 UURB 0.235 0.259 
      (4.53)** 
     [4.02]** 
   (4.92)** 
   [4.19]** 
 
 AGE      0.769  
        (2.14)* 
    [1.63] 
 
 
 CFAC  0.042 
   (1.51) 
[1.53] 
 
 DUMMY 6.722 7.067 
       (5.49)** 
    [5.52]** 
    (5.40)** 
   [5.40]** 
    
 Constant -28.90 -10.58 
      (-2.71)** 
   [2.40]* 
    (2.05)* 
  [1.69] 
 
 
    Adjusted R2 0.75 0.74 
 
 
 
                                                       
7 Note that the use of DUMMY in the regression models accounts, at best, only for within-year clustering induced 
by unobserved shocks that are common to all countries, and not for the more serious issue of country-specific 
factors that are otherwise unaccounted for in the model. 
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 To check this possibility, we re-estimate the Table 1 models using robust 
standard errors – as documented in Arellano (1987) and Peterson (2007) - that are 
adjusted to account for within-country correlation. The resulting coefficient t-statistics 
appear in square brackets in Table 1.8  Although this adjustment makes little 
difference to the precision with which most variable coefficients are estimated, one 
difference is striking: in both models, the GUYRS coefficient estimate is now 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. That is, once possible dependence 
between country observations is properly accounted for, the apparent explanatory 
power of local loop unbundling for broadband penetration disappears. 
 
3.  Local loop unbundling and broadband uptake: economic issues 
The analysis of section 2 casts doubt on the importance of local loop unbundling for 
encouraging broadband uptake, at least within the framework of OECD (2007).  
Readers who are otherwise sympathetic to the importance of unbundling might 
reasonably respond that the dataset is small and, inevitably in a field subject to rapid 
technological change, contains considerable noise. Consequently, the positive 
relationship between QTOT and GUYRS, while imprecisely estimated, may 
nevertheless be evidence of a real economic phenomenon. 
 One way to assess this argument is to calculate the economic (or quantitative) 
significance of the estimated unbundling effect.  In column (A) of Table 1, the 
estimated GUYRS coefficient is 0.59, while in column (B) it is 0.65.  That is, for each 
additional year that local loop unbundling has been in place, the average OECD 
country can expect an increase in broadband uptake of 0.59-0.65 connections per 100 
of population.  So, for example, a country with a population of 20 million could 
expect to add 118000-130000 extra broadband connections in the first year following 
unbundling of the local loop. 
 To put these numbers in context, compare them to the corresponding 
coefficient estimates for the year variable (DUMMY) of 6.72 and 7.07 respectively.  
A simple calculation then tells us that the mere elapsing of an additional year of time 
has an effect on broadband uptake that is 3.6 - 3.8 times larger than that of an 
additional year of unbundling policy being in place.  This point can be further 
                                                       
8  The coefficient estimates themselves do not, of course, change, since we continue to use OLS estimation. 
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illustrated by applying the results of the model to individual countries.  For example, 
it predicts that local loop unbundling in New Zealand would lead to approximately 
25,000 additional broadband connections per annum.  But New Zealand already had 
over 340,000 connections in 2005, so the contribution of unbundling to broadband 
growth is small.  And the model also indicates that about 90,000 more connections 
would be sold each year regardless of whether unbundling occurs or not. 
That the simple passing of time should have such a large impact on broadband 
uptake is not surprising.  All new technologies take time to diffuse through an 
economy.  Different individuals value the technology differently, new applications 
utilising the technology are continually altering the benefits that consumers can 
accrue, different applications are valued differently by individuals in different 
contexts, and different consumers take different amounts of time to learn about the 
benefits that the new technology offers them, meaning they purchase at different 
times (Howell & Obren, 2002; Howell, 2008).  These factors lead to the emergence of 
a time-based S-shaped diffusion curve for broadband (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1: Technology Diffusion Curve 
 
Source: Grosso (2006) 
 
 Assuming the underlying uptake pattern is identical for all countries, if the 
technology is first made available in different countries at different times, then at any 
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given time, all countries will be at a different point of the diffusion curve.  The exact 
position will be determined by the length of time the technology has been available.  
The country where it was made available first will have the highest penetration; the 
one where it was made available last will have the lowest.  Thus, all else equal, the 
length of time that the technology has been available is likely to be an important 
determinant of broadband penetration.  Indeed, the results in Table 1 indicate that it is 
considerably more important than the introduction of local loop unbundling. 
Diffusion effects may also cause the unbundling impact observed in Table 1 – 
limited though it is – to be overstated. To see this, note that the use of GUYRS as the 
indicator of local loop unbundling implicitly assumes that the impact of unbundling 
increases with time. While this may not be unreasonable in itself, it does mean that 
the estimated coefficient is unable to distinguish between true unbundling effects and 
simple time effects.  As a result, the apparent importance of local loop unbundling for 
broadband uptake in the results of OECD (2007) may reflect, at least partly, simple 
diffusion effects. To check the potential seriousness of this problem, we extend the 
Table 1 regressions in two steps.  First, we replace GUYRS with an indicator variable 
(LLU_YES) set equal to 1 if the country has implemented local loop unbundling in or 
prior to the year of observation and zero otherwise, i.e., a simple ‘yes-no’ 
categorization of unbundling.  The results of this procedure appear in columns (A) 
and (B) of Table 2 and reveal that the estimated LLU_YES coefficients are 
insignificantly different from zero, both with and without robust standard errors.  This 
suggests that the explanatory power of GUYRS – as reported in Table 1 – is primarily 
due to its time-varying component rather than to any fixed unbundling effect. 
The critical question raised by this finding is whether the time-varying 
component of GUYRS is simply picking up broadband diffusion effects.  The second 
component of our additional tests thus includes in regressions an additional control 
variable (AVAILABLE) set equal to the number of years that the broadband 
technology has been available for each country.9  Columns (C) and (D) of Table 2 
indicate that inclusion of this variable has a considerable impact on the importance of 
GUYRS in explaining broadband penetration: the estimated GUYRS coefficients fall 
in size to less than 75% of their Table 1 counterparts and none is statistically 
significant, even with non-adjusted standard errors.  This suggests that much of the 
                                                       
9   Multicollinearity problems force the deletion of DUMMY in these regressions.  
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explanatory power attributed to GUYRS in OECD (2007) is due to its relationship 
with the length of time that broadband has been available.10 
  
Table 2: Further Regression Analysis  
LLU-YES equals 1 if the country has implemented local loop unbundling in or prior to the year of 
observation and zero otherwise; AVAILABLE equals the number of years broadband has been 
available in the country.  All other details are the same as in Table 1.  
 
 Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) 
  
GUYRS 
   
0.435 
 
0.459 
    
 
 
(1.59) 
[1.01] 
(1.67) 
[1.03] 
 LLU_YES 1.708 2.247   
  (1.02)  
[0.64] 
 
(1.31) 
[0.81] 
  
 LNPDSL -2.544 -2.549 -2.223 -2.168 
      (5.35)** 
    [6.12]** 
     (5.20)** 
     [4.74]** 
 
   (3.91)** 
   [3.48]** 
    (3.78)** 
    [3.19]** 
 UURB 0.229 0.256 0.155 0.164 
      (4.16)** 
    [3.30]** 
   (4.56)** 
   [3.43]** 
 
(2.55)* 
[2.53]* 
    (2.70)** 
   [3.01]** 
 AGE    0.908  0.423  
        (2.41)* 
     [2.07]* 
 
 (1.02) 
[0.97] 
 
 CFAC  0.049  0.004 
   (1.66) 
[1.75] 
 
 (0.14) 
[0.12] 
 DUMMY 7.511 8.031   
  (5.90)** 
[6.77]** 
    (5.84)** 
   [6.49]** 
 
  
 AVAILABLE   1.429 1.480 
   
 
 
     (3.40)** 
   [3.16]** 
(3.50)** 
[2.95]** 
 Constant -30.13 -8.54 -14.08 -3.335 
      (-2.65)** 
   [2.63]* 
    (1.51) 
  [1.09] 
 
(1.18) 
[1.33] 
(0.61) 
[0.52] 
 
 
    Adjusted R2 0.75 0.73 0.67 0.67 
 
                                                       
10   Unsurprisingly, GUYRS is strongly correlated  in the data sample with AVAILABLE, which in turn is strongly correlated 
with QTOT: both Pearson correlation coefficients exceed 0.5 and are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
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4.  Conclusion  
Our analysis of the data contained in OECD (2007) suggests that the contribution of 
local loop unbundling to the level of national broadband uptake is materially very 
small and, after correcting for data dependencies, statistically insignificant.  
Moreover, what effect there is appears to be largely spurious, reflecting the impact of 
increasing broadband diffusion rather than unbundling per se.  Of course, additional 
evidence favouring the efficacy of unbundling may yet emerge as more data become 
available.  But until such evidence appears, the case for unbundling as a stimulant of 
broadband penetration remains unproven.  In particular, the results in OECD (2007) 
cannot be used to justify arguments that local loop unbundling is a necessary policy 
for inducing meaningful increases in national broadband uptake. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1: Expanded OECD Data – 2002 
  QTOT LNPDSL AGE UURB CFAC GUYRS 
Australia 1.84 4.67 28.4 88.2 51.1 3 
Austria 5.61 4.16 30.1 66 60.2 4 
Belgium 8.67 2.52 29.3 97.2 42.1 2 
Canada 12.11 3.56 30.5 80.1 56.4 6 
Denmark 8.25 4.14 28.7 85.6 30.8 5 
Finland 5.45 4.48 29.3 61.1 19.2 7 
France 2.76 4.69 27.3 76.7 16.7 2 
Germany 4.05 3.87 30.6 75.2 4.5 5 
Hungary 0.65 4.8 27.7 66.3 51.2 1 
Iceland 8.45 5.05 27.3 92.8 2.1 3 
Ireland 0.27 4.87 26.6 60.5 68.9 2 
Italy 1.68 4.2 28.8 67.6 14.4 2 
Japan 6.13 -0.02 26.5 65.8 27.7 6 
Luxembourg 1.54 5.27 32.1 82.8 18.9 2 
Mexico 0.25 5.49 29 76 68.4 -3 
Netherlands 7.04 3.6 30.1 80.2 70.1 5 
New Zealand 1.61 3.38 28.2 86.2 15.8 -3 
Norway 4.2 4.26 28.3 77.4 31.8 2 
Poland 0.3 5.08 28.6 62.1 87.7 0 
Spain 2.98 5.31 28.6 76.7 80.2 2 
Sweden 8.07 4.57 27.1 84.2 20.9 2 
Switzerland 5.64 4.81 30.3 75.2 41.5 -3 
United Kingdom 2.32 4.24 27.7 89.7 52.0 2 
United States 6.92 3.65 28.7 80.8 88.4 7 
       
Mean 4.45 4.19 28.74 77.27 57.0 2.54 
Std. Dev 3.28 1.14 1.38 10.27 67.4 2.86 
Source: John de Ridder and OECD (2005:114) 
